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Abstract
Deep product quantization network (DPQN) has recently re-
ceived much attention in fast image retrieval tasks due to its
efficiency of encoding high-dimensional visual features espe-
cially when dealing with large-scale datasets. Recent studies
show that deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to in-
put with small and maliciously designed perturbations (a.k.a.,
adversarial examples). This phenomenon raises the concern
of security issues for DPQN in the testing/deploying stage as
well. However, little effort has been devoted to investigating
how adversarial examples affect DPQN. To this end, we pro-
pose product quantization adversarial generation (PQ-AG), a
simple yet effective method to generate adversarial examples
for product quantization based retrieval systems. PQ-AG aims
to generate imperceptible adversarial perturbations for query
images to form adversarial queries, whose nearest neighbors
from a targeted product quantizaiton model are not seman-
tically related to those from the original queries. Extensive
experiments show that our PQ-AQ successfully creates ad-
versarial examples to mislead targeted product quantization
retrieval models. Besides, we found that our PQ-AG signifi-
cantly degrades retrieval performance in both white-box and
black-box settings.
Introduction
The massive application of large scale and high dimensional
image data has attracted great attention to the study of ef-
ficient image retrieval methods. In order to strike the bal-
ance between storage and precision, approximate nearest
neighbor (ANN) based retrieval methods (Datar et al. 2004;
Gionis et al. 1999; Muja and Lowe 2009; G, T, and P
2006) have been widely studied. Among these methods,
product quantization (PQ) based retrieval (Je´gou, Douze,
and Schmid 2013; Ge et al. 2013) becomes popular due
to the efficiency and effectiveness of PQ for coding high-
dimensional visual features. Recently proposed deep prod-
uct quantization network (DPQN) based methods (Cao et al.
2016; Klein and Wolf 2019; Yu et al. 2018; Liu et al. 2019)
combine the representative power of deep neural networks
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Figure 1: An example of adversarial attack against DPQN.
Although the added perturbation is almost invisible, it suc-
cessfully causes the query to shift a lot in deep PQ feature
space, and fools the DPQN to retrieve semantically irrele-
vant images.
(DNNs) with PQ, and achieve impressive performance and
efficiency.
On the other hand, recent studies show that DNNs are vul-
nerable to input images with carefully designed yet imper-
ceptible perturbations, i.e., adversarial examples, which can
cause DNN classifier to produce confidently wrong predic-
tions (Szegedy et al. 2014). To date, much attention has been
drawn to crafting adversarial examples in image classifica-
tion task, while little effort has been devoted to investigating
how adversarial examples affect DPQN for image retrieval.
This raises the concern of security issues of DPQN in prac-
tice. As shown in Fig. 1, DPQN based image retrieval system
is successfully misled by an adversarial query image with
imperceptible perturbations. Note that the well-known ad-
versarial attacks for image classification can be interpreted
as maximizing the classification error via tuning the input
image according to the direction of gradients. However, at-
tacking DPQN retrieval systems can be much more chal-
lenging than the classification task for two main reasons:
1) in an image retrieval task, a query image is searched
through a database on visual features in the absence of class
labels; 2) the optimization of adversarial attacks generally
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relies on back-propagation that requires differentiable oper-
ations, while DPQN consists of product quantization opera-
tion, which is indifferentiable.
Motivated by the above observations, we propose product
quantization adversarial generation (PQ-AG), a simple yet
effective method to craft adversarial examples for deep prod-
uct quantization models. Given a clean query image and a
targeted product quantization retrieval model, our proposed
PQ-AG method can generate adversarial queries with small
and well-crafted perturbations to fool the targeted model to
retrieve semantically irrelevant images from the database.
Specifically, we first formulate the objective as a feature sep-
aration problem, which pushes the features of adversarial
query away from those of the original neighbors. Further-
more, to deal with the indifferentiable issue of PQ, we al-
ternatively propose to maximize the difference of the code-
words assignment probability distribution between the ad-
versarial query and the original one, where the distributions
can be estimated based on the similarity between features
and codewords.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We propose a simple yet effective product quantization
adversarial generation (PQ-AG) method to mislead the
DPQN based image retrieval systems. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first attempt of adversarial attack
design targeting on the DPQN based image retrieval sys-
tem.
• In order to tackle the indifferentiable problem of product
quantization, we propose a novel strategy to design an ad-
versarial query by perturbing the probability distribution
of codewords assignments for a clean query.
• We evaluate PQ-AG on a variety of datasets and model
structures. Experimental results demonstrate the effec-
tiveness and transferability of our method in both white-
box and black-box settings.
Related Work
We give the formal definition of PQ and briefly review re-
cent advances of PQ based retrieval methods applied in lager
scale and high dimension datasets. Then we also provide a
brief introduction to some related works on adversarial at-
tack.
PQ based Image retrieval systems
To efficiently conduct the approximate nearest neighbor
(ANN) search for image retrieval in large scale databases,
existing mainstream approaches can be divided into two two
categories: 1) hashing based methods 2) PQ based meth-
ods. Hashing method aims at learning a hash function, which
maps the original data points to a binary code. The main ad-
vantage of hashing methods is the fast-retrieval speed due to
the computation by hamming distance and low storage over-
head. Unlike hashing methods that can only produce a few
distinct distances, PQ based methods can better describe the
distance between data points, whose goal is to employ K-
means individually in each subspace of original data points
or their transformed ones. Next, we will briefly describe the
core of PQ based image retrieval methods.
Formally, suppose that D ⊆ RD is a database contain-
ing N data points, a given vector x ∈ D is first par-
titioned into M sub-vectors with equal dimension D/M ,
i.e. x = (x1,x2, ...,xM). Then each subvector xm, m ∈
[M ] , {1, 2, . . . ,M}, is quantized into the K centroids
within a sub-codebook Cm = {cm1, . . . , cmK} in each sub-
space uniquely as
q(xm) = argmin
k
||xm − cmk||22, (1)
where cmk is the k-th centroid in the m-th sub-codebook.
Therefore, every data point x can be approximately repre-
sented by its corresponding centroids, i.e.,
x ≈ q(x) = (q(x1), ..., q(xM)).
Note that PQ can generate a Cartesian product codebook
C = C1 × C2 × . . . CM with an exponential size. The cost
of the storage is low with O(DK) and the retrieval speed is
fast due to the use of look-up tables.
In the retrieval stage, PQ-based methods conduct approx-
imated nearest neighbor (ANN) based on similarity mea-
sure between two images in feature space. There are two
main types of similarity measures, i.e., symmetric distance
computation (SDC) and asymmetric distance computation
(ADC), to approximate Euclidean distance computation be-
tween the query y and the vector x in the database, which is
defined as follows:
dSDC(y,x) ≈ d(q(y), q(x)) =
√√√√ M∑
m=1
d(q(ym), q(xm))2,
dADC(y,x) ≈ d(y, q(x)) =
√√√√ M∑
m=1
d(ym, q(xm))2,
where d(·, ·) denotes the Euclidean distance.
Recently, many PQ based methods (Je´gou, Douze, and
Schmid 2013; Ge et al. 2013; Wang et al. 2014; Kalan-
tidis and Avrithis 2014; Babenko and Lempitsky 2014;
Wang et al. 2016; Yu et al. 2017; Wu et al. 2017; Li et
al. 2017; Wang and Zhang 2019) have been developed for
fast image retrieval. To obtain better retrieval performance,
deep product quantization network (DPQN) based methods
(Cao et al. 2016; Klein and Wolf 2019; Liu et al. 2019;
Yu et al. 2018) have been recently proposed by combining
PQ and deep convolutional neural network. Cao et al. (2016)
gave a step forward in this direction and proposed the deep
quantization network (DQN) to capture good hashing based
image representations under a similarity-preserving and a
product quantization loss. Later, deep product quantization
(DPQ) (Klein and Wolf 2019) was developed by cluster op-
timization of PQ with the supervised signal and the parame-
ters update of the fully-connected layer simultaneously. Liu
et al. (2019) proposed the deep triplet quantization (DTQ)
to learn deep quantization models by introducing a novel
similarity triplet loss in the training process. To better incor-
porate PQ in a neural network, product quantization network
Code Book
Feature Extractor
Product Quantization
DPQN
Normal Cetroid Distribution
Perturbed Cetroid Distribution
Attack
Normal Query
Adversarial Query
Forward Pass
Backward Pass
Figure 2: The overall pipeline of the proposed PQ-AG method against DPQN based retrieval systems. A query is first fed into
the CNN model, then the normal centroid distribution is computed based on the cosine similarity between the deep feature and
centroids of the codebook. The goal of PQ-AG is to perturb the distribution, thus disrupting the subsequent retrieval operation.
Gradients of the perturbation will be back-propagated to update the adversarial query.
(PQN) (Yu et al. 2018) adds a soft product quantization layer
to the neural network and obtains a clever codewords assign-
ment according to the similarity between the features, which
mitigates the over-fitting problem and consistently outper-
forms other methods. Despite of many DPQN based retrieval
methods, little effort has been devoted to the security issue
of DPQN for image retrieval, which is the main reason why
we investigate how adversarial examples affect DPQN.
Adversarial Examples
Recent studies show that deep neural networks (DNNs) are
vulnerable to input with small and maliciously designed
perturbations, i.e., adversarial examples. Depending on the
access permission to the information of the neural net-
work, including the neural structure and parameters, ad-
versarial attacks can be roughly divided into two types:
white-box (Szegedy et al. 2014; Goodfellow, Shlens, and
Szegedy 2015) and black-box attacks (Carlini and Wag-
ner 2017; Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015; Bhagoji
et al. 2018). White-box attacks can obtain better perfor-
mance, since they can easily access to the gradient infor-
mation of DNNs. Among them, Szegedy et al. (2014) re-
cently showed that some targeted neural networks can be
easily fooled by crafted adversarial examples. Other attack
algorithms like fast gradient sign method (FGSM) based
methods (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015; Madry
et al. 2018) also obtain remarkable performance. Instead,
black-box attacks (Carlini and Wagner 2017; Goodfellow,
Shlens, and Szegedy 2015; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. 2017;
Bhagoji et al. 2018) are more challenging, since they cannot
access to the information of DNNs. Besides these attacks on
image classification task, some other methods focus on the
adversarial attack on other tasks, including image caption-
ing (Chen et al. 2017) and semantic segmentation (Xie et al.
2017).
However, little effort has been devoted to the image re-
trieval task. To the best of our knowledge, two related works,
i.e., hash adversary generation (HAG) (Yang et al. 2018)
and UAA-GAN (Zhao et al. 2019), both focus on adversar-
ial attack on image retrieval. Nevertheless, there exist two
main differences compared with our method. 1) Our work
is a first attempt to consider the adversary generation for
product quantization based image retrieval, while HAG and
UAA-GAN focus on hashing based adversarial perturba-
tion generation and generative network design for conven-
tional retrieval systems, respectively; 2) our work focuses
on designing a simple yet effective attack method in product
quantization feature space, which is more challenging, while
HAG and UAA-GAN concentrate on attacking in deep fea-
ture space.
Product Quantization Adversarial Generation
In this section, we would demonstrate how product quan-
tization adversarial generation (PQ-AG) algorithm gener-
ates adversarial queries to fool the DPQN based retrieval
method into retrieving semantically irrelevant images. As
shown in Fig. 2, our PQ-AG can generate adversarial query
by perturbing the centroid distribution in product quantiza-
tion space to attack DPQN.
Formulation of the Overall Objectives
In an image retrieval task, adversarial query generation al-
gorithms for a targeted retrieval system usually consider the
following problem: for a given query y, the goal of adver-
sarial query generation is to generate its corresponding ad-
versarial example yˆ, whose retrieval results are semantically
irrelevant to y. Denote F (·, ·) as a feature-dependent trans-
formation functions whose output contains the semantic in-
formation of the original feature. We further denote d(·, ·) as
a metric to measure the similarity between F (y) and F (yˆ).
Therefore, the core idea of generating adversarial queries is
to expand the distance as defined by metric d between the
semantic features F (yˆ) and F (y) for adversarial and clean
queries.
To this end, we can formulate the adversarial query gen-
eration problem as follows:
min
yˆ
L(y, yˆ) = −d (F (y), F (yˆ))
s.t. ||y − yˆ|| ≤ η,
(2)
where d(·, ·) is a similarity measure function, e.g. Euclidean
distance, || · || can be any norm specified by the user, e.g.,
`0, `1, or `∞-norm, and η > 0 denotes the magnitude of the
attack.
For example, if we set F (·, ·) to be a CNN feature ex-
tractor FCNN() and d(·, ·) to be Euclidean distance, then the
objective function (2) can be formulated as:
min
yˆ
L(y, yˆ) = −||FCNN(y), FCNN(yˆ)||22
s.t. ||y − yˆ|| ≤ η.
(3)
In practise, (3) represents the attack on a general deep fea-
ture based retrieval system. Therefore, we adopt (3) as the
baseline method in our experiments.
In order to design a more successful attack against DPQN,
we need have a closer look at its retrieval process. As shown
in Fig. 2, DPQN mainly consists of a feature extractor and
a PQ codebook. During retrieval process, the input query is
first fed into the feature extractor, which is usually a pre-
trained convolutional neural network (CNN). Afterwards,
the features are quantized as the closest centroids from the
codebook, and the quantized feature can be written as:
F (y) = q (FCNN(y)) , (4)
where q(·) denotes the product quantization operation as (1),
which will be also referred to as hard centroid assignment
operation in the subsequent parts. The retrieval results can
then be determined as the nearest neighbors of the product-
quantized feature from the database.
It is clear that product quantization plays a key role in the
above DPQN based retrieval process. Therefore, attacking
on the quantized feature could be an effective way for ad-
versarial query generation.
The specific form of (2) against DPQN can thus be for-
mulated as:
min
yˆ
L(y, yˆ) = −||q (FCNN(y))− q (FCNN(yˆ)) ||22
s.t. ||y − yˆ|| ≤ η.
(5)
The next step is to optimize the objective in (5). Since
the function q(·) in (5) involves the indifferentiable opera-
tion, i.e., hard codewords assignment, it is infeasible to di-
rectly optimize (5) based on back propagation. To solve this
problem, we alternatively propose the soft codewords as-
signment, whose details are shown in the following sections.
PQ based Attack via Centroid Distribution
Perturbation
The proposed PG-AG seeks to generate adversarial exam-
ples in PQ feature space. From the above analysis, the main
challenge of our PQ-AG lies in the indifferentiable issue of
PQ. To solve this issue, we alternatively estimate the proba-
bility distribution of codewords assignment of a clean query
based on the hard version (1), i.e., one-hot encoding.
Attack on the Peak of the Centroid Distribution (Type I
Attack) Denotes z as the l2-normalized feature extracted
from a pre-trained CNN for y. Then the sub-vectors of
z is assigned to the optimal centroids of sub-codebook
{cmk}M,Km=1,k=1, and the indices (b1, b2, . . . , bm) of z =
(z1, z2, ..., zM) can be specifically computed by
bm = argmax
k
〈zm, cmk〉, m ∈ [M ]. (6)
In order to solve the gradient-vanishing problem, we adopt
the soft centroid assignment first proposed in (Yu et al.
2018). In detail, we calculate the soft probability distribu-
tion pˆm = (pˆm1, pˆm2, . . . , pˆmK) of assigning the subvector
zˆm of zˆ = FCNN(yˆ) to the centroids {cmk}Kk=1 based on
the respective cosine similarities as follows.
pˆmk =
e〈zˆm,cmk〉∑
k′ e
〈zˆm,cmk′ 〉 , k ∈ [K]. (7)
It is easy to obtain the ground-truth probability distribution
pm, i.e., one-hot encoding of the clean query y according to
(6). If we take the cross-entropy loss as our metric d to mea-
sure the similarity between pˆm and pm, then the objective
function (2) can be specifically formulated as:
min
yˆ
L(y, yˆ) =
∑
m
−d(pˆm,pm)
=
∑
m
∑
k
log(pˆmk)1(k = bm)
=
∑
m
∑
k
log
(
e〈zˆm,cmk〉∑
k′ e
〈zˆm,cmk′ 〉
)
1(k = bm),
s.t. ||y − yˆ|| ≤ η,
(8)
where 1(·) is an indicator function.
Note that the above objective (8) bears a resemblence to
the loss commonly used in untargeted attack for classifica-
tion tasks, where the pˆmk corresponds to the probability of
classifying the adversarial example to the kth class and bm
corresponds to the true label. As shown in Fig. 3a, this kind
of attack effectively decrease the probability of selecting the
peak centroid of original distribution.
Attack on the Overall Centroid Distribution (Type II At-
tack) Type I attack, however, may still have some limita-
tions due to the following two key observations for symmet-
ric and asymmetric retrieval attacks.
• In the phase of the symmetric retrieval, both the feature
of query and database images will be quantized. Fig. 3
shows that attacking on the peak will merely push the
(a) Type I Attack (b) Type II Attack
Figure 3: Centroid distribution under Type I and Type II at-
tack. Normal distrbution is plotted with green color while the
perturbed distribution with red color. Compared with Type I
attack, Type II attack disrupts the overall distribution instead
of simply focusing on the peak.
original centroid distribution towards a multi-peak dis-
tribution, of which the peaks correspond to the orig-
inally high-probability centroids. Moreover, those cen-
troids with high probabilities, i.e., centroids with small
angular difference, are very similar. Therefore, for a sym-
metric retrieval system, optimizing (8) may simply re-
place the hard-quantized centroids of a clean query y with
slightly different ones, thus unable to effectively increas-
ing the quantization error or attack effect.
• In the phase of the asymmetric retrieval, only the fea-
ture of database images will be quantized. Therefore
the similarity score or relevance between a query fea-
ture z = (z1, z2, ..., zM) and a database feature x =
(x1,x2, ...,xM) is defined as
s(z,x) =
M∑
m=1
〈zm, cmbm〉,
where bm = argmaxk 〈xm, cmk〉, m ∈ [M ]. Note that
the scores are clearly determined by the inner product
pairs {〈zm, cmk〉 | m ∈ [M ], k ∈ [K]} and implicitly
determined by the distribution {pmk}M,Km=1,k=1 computed
by (7). Consequently, it’s crucial to distort the overall dis-
tribution instead of focusing purely on attacking the peak
of the distribution of a clean query y as in (8).
The above two observations motive us to pay more at-
tention to perturbing the overall soft-quantized distributions
{pmk}M,Km=1,k=1 of a clean query y. To this end, we re-
place the one-hot distribution in (8) with the soft distribu-
tion {pmk}M,Km=1,k=1 as (7) to learn an adversarial query yˆ.
Formally, we reformulate the objective (2) as follows:
min
yˆ
L(y, yˆ) =
∑
m
∑
k
pmk log(pˆmk),
s.t. ||y − yˆ|| ≤ η.
(9)
Note that optimizing (9) is equivalent to maximize the KL
divergence between the real distributions {pmk}M,Km=1,k=1
and adversarial distributions {pˆmk}M,Km=1,k=1. In this way, we
can completely push the feature away from those centroids
with high probabilities. Especially for the asymmetric at-
tack, we have expanded the distance between the adversarial
distribution {pˆmk}M,Km=1,k=1 and the original one, thus differ-
entiating the similarity scores for yˆ and y. As illustrated in
Fig. 3b, Type II Attack leads to a more disordered distribu-
tion, which is harder to defend. More results about our Type
I and II Attacks are shown in the experiment section.
Experiments
In this section, we evaluate our proposed product quantiza-
tion adversarial generation (PQ-AG) algorithm on two pub-
lic benchmark datasets: CIFAR-10 and NUS-WIDE. We
first introduce the datasets, evaluation metric and implemen-
tation details. Then we present and analyze the experimental
results in detail.
Datasets and Metrics
CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky and Hinton 2009) contains 60000
color images of size 32× 32 divided into 10 classes, each of
which contains 6000 images. Following conventional con-
figuration (Yu et al. 2018), (Cao et al. 2016), the training of
targeted product quantization retrieval model is conducted
on the training set containing 50000 images, while the test
set is randomly divided into 9000 images as a database and
1000 images as queries.
NUS-WIDE (Chua et al. 2009) is a large scale dataset
for multilabel classification tasks. NUS-WIDE consists of
269648 images and each image is assigned with one or mul-
tiple labels related to 81 concepts. We select the subset of
186577 images associated with the 10 most popular con-
cepts. The training set and test set are separated as default
setting in (Chua et al. 2009). For the generation of adversar-
ial queries, 1000 images are randomly selected from the test
set as query images, while the remaining images are used as
database images.
Evaluation Metrics We adopt the standard metric in image
retrieval tasks, mean Average Precision (mAP), to evaluate
the effectiveness of our methods. For the fairness of compar-
ison, we evaluate the retrieval performance in both SDC and
ADC settings, where SDC retrieval systems symmetrically
quantize both query and database images and ADC systems
quantize query images only.
Implementations
Unless otherwise stated, the targeted deep PQ models are
constructed with the most common configuration. First, the
base models (e.g. AlexNet, VGG) are pretrained on the
evaluated datasets. Afterwards, we extract features from
the top layer of the pretrained networks for each of the
database images. Then the feature vectors are partitioned
into M sub-vectors and K-means clustering is conducted for
each of the M subspace, obtaining the respective codebooks
{cmk}M,Km=1,k=1.
All the experiments are conducted based on the PyTorch
framework.
PQ-AG methods are implemented based on AdverTorch
(Ding, Wang, and Jin 2019) Framework. For adversarial
query generation, we adopt PGD (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and
CIFAR-10 NUS-WIDE
Alex VGG Alex VGG
16bits 24bits 36bits 16bits 24bits 36bits 16bits 24bits 36bits 16bits 24bits 36bits
SDC
Clean 81.0 83.9 84.1 83.6 86.7 86.9 65.7 66.0 66.1 72.1 73.6 73.6
Basic 27.5 22.1 26.7 19.9 14.8 13.0 47.7 47.2 46.8 37.0 34.7 33.9
APD 13.7 15.7 17.5 16 10.9 9.1 31.5 29.8 28.9 30.9 29.2 28.1
AOD 12.3 14.8 17.2 13.6 9.5 8.0 28.9 28.9 28.8 28.5 26.7 25.7
ADC
Clean 81.3 84.5 84.6 84.0 86.3 86.7 66.2 66.1 65.9 73.2 73.4 73.3
Basic 25.3 22.1 26.7 18 13.4 12.2 46.5 46.3 46.2 35.0 33.5 33.0
APD 10.3 14.4 17.2 13.5 9.4 8.2 30.3 28.9 28.3 28.6 27.5 27.0
AOD 10.2 13.2 16.6 12.0 8.5 7.4 28.2 28.1 28.5 26.3 25.0 24.6
Table 1: The white-box attack results for a different number of bits of two models on CIFAR-10 and NUS-WIDE. Lower mAP
means better attack performance.
Bengio 2017) to optimize our proposed algorithms. The
learning rate is set to 0.01, and each query is trained for 5 it-
erations. The adversarial purturbations are restricted within
8 by Linf (pixel values are clipped in [0, 255]).
Attack Evaluation
We evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed PQ-AG algo-
rithm containing two types of attacks, i.e., Type I: Attak on
the Peak of Centroid Distribution (APD) and Type II: Attak
on the Overall Centroid Distribution (AOD) on the datasets
discussed above. The basic attack (denoted as basic) intro-
duced in (3) is also evaluated in the experiments. In total,
the experiments are conducted on three well-known network
structures (AlexNet, VGG, and ResNet, each with multiple
models). The performance of the proposed methods under
white-box and-black box settings will be examined in the
following experiments, respectively.
Clean
Basic
APD
AOD
Query Retrieval Rank List
Figure 4: Examples of retrieval results for the respective at-
tack, where irrelevant retrieval results are labeled with red
borders.
White-Box Attack We first evaluate the white-box effec-
tiveness of the proposed attacks against basic attack across
encoding bits. To make a more comprehensive comparison,
we use AlexNet and VGG16 in white-box experiments. The
mAP for the datasets under various attacks with the encod-
ing bits ranging from 16 bits to 32 bits, are shown in Tab. 1.
Clearly, it can be seen from Tab. 1 that modern product quan-
tization based image retrieval models are extremely vulner-
able to adversarial queries. Even under the simplest basic
attack, the mAP value drops significantly by 57.7% on av-
erage. Then APD attack consistently outperforms the Basic
Attack across models and encoding bits for both CIFAR-
10 and NUS-WIDE datasets, which reveals that for prod-
uct quantization systems, manipulating the original quanti-
zation results is an effective means of increasing the quanti-
zation error, thus result in the precision dropping drastically.
AOD attack shows its priority over APD attack, and con-
tinue to diminish the mAP for most settings. Such an im-
proved result means that, despite its success in image classi-
fication attacks, decreasing the probability for the most prob-
able centroids (class in the case of image classification) may
not be the best solution to image retrieval attacks. Instead,
we should disrupt the overall distribution of the codebook.
Some visualization can be found in Fig. 4.
Precision Recall (PR) curves for the proposed methods on
CIFAR-10 and NUS-WIDE are shown in Fig. 5. For the fair-
ness of comparison and better visualization, all the curves
are calculated with 16-bits quantization. We can see from
Fig. 5 that, different from the original one, PR curves for
adversarial examples have a monotone increasing tendency
and become furthest away from the original curves for the
top retrieval regions, where the recall precision is low. This
demonstrates that the proposed attacks completely disrupt
the semantic information in the feature space, and effec-
tively pushes the features of adversarial queries away from
the originally relevant images in the database.
We also demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed at-
tacks on the state-of-the-art DPQN. More specifically, we
adopt the method proposed in (Yu et al. 2018), and jointly
train the retrieval model with PQ code-book in an end-to-
end manner. The attack results against state-of-the-art re-
trieval models on CIFAR-10 are shown in Tab. 2. As can be
seen from Tab. 2, despite the improved performance on clean
data, the jointly trained models still suffer from the lack of
robustness. In fact, comparing Tab. 2 with Tab. 1, we could
find that the jointly trained models are even less robust than
the pretrained models against our PQ-AG attacks. These re-
(a) AlexNet on CIFAR-10 (b) VGG16 on CIFAR-10 (c) AlexNet on NUS-WIDE (d) VGG16 on NUS-WIDE
Figure 5: PR curves for AlexNet and VGG16 on CIFAR-10 and NUS-WIDE, respectively.
sults indicate that robustness should also be included in eval-
uation when designing DPQNs in the future.
16bits 24bits 36bits
Alex
Clean 87.9 / 87.8 89.6 / 89.4 89.7 / 89.5
Basic 17.8 / 12.8 12.1 / 9.5 9.7 / 8.4
APD 15.0 / 9.5 9.7 / 6.6 7.4 / 5.7
AOD 11.5 / 8.8 8.2 / 6.5 6.5 / 5.8
Table 2: White-box attack results for the jointly trained
model on CIFAR-10.
Black-Box Attack We try to evaluate the Type II PQ-AG
attack in the black-box settings from two aspects as follows:
• Bits Transferibility: For a given targeted model with var-
ious code lengths, the generated adversarial queries can be
transferable.
• Model Transferibility: For various model architectures,
the generated adversarial queries can be transferable.
16bits 24bits 36bits
Alex
Clean 81.0 / 81.3 83.9 / 84.5 84.1 / 84.6
16bits 12.3 / 10.2 13.6 / 13.4 17.0 / 15.4
24bits 15.5 / 14.3 14.8 / 13.2 16.7 / 15.7
36bits 17.6 / 19.2 15.9 / 15.1 17.2 / 16.6
VGG
Clean 83.6 / 84.0 86.7 / 86.3 86.9 / 86.7
16bits 13.6 / 12.0 9.6 / 8.6 8.4 / 7.8
24bits 13.8 / 13.3 9.5 / 8.5 8.3 / 7.7
36bits 13.5 / 11.8 9.4 / 8.4 8.0 / 7.4
Table 3: Evaluation results for bits transferability.
The bits transferability of PQ-AG can be found in Tab.
3. Each row header of Tab. 3 represents the code length of
the model for generating the clean and adversarial queries,
and each column header represents the code length of the
targeted model. The experiments are conducted on CIFAR-
10 for both AlexNet and VGG16 models. As can be seen
from the table, the mAP values (SDC/ADC) in each column
are really close, which verifies the transferability of PQ-AG
across bits. This could be attributed to the fact that the cen-
troids in the codebooks across code lengths are essentially
cluster centers from the same feature space. Therefore, cen-
troids in a larger code book could be seen as interpolation
among the ones in a smaller codebook. As a result, perturb-
ing the centroid distribution for one of the code lengths could
lead to the corresponding distributions of all code lengths to
be disrupted.
Res18 Res34 Res50 VGG11 VGG13 VGG16
SDC
Clean 87.7 89.2 87.1 84.3 85.0 83.6
Res18 9.5 36.8 46.0 66.9 67.5 64.5
Res34 30.8 10.8 33.8 62.5 62.2 60.0
Res50 38.6 32.7 10.5 65.4 65.4 62.4
VGG11 71.0 73.0 73.5 12.6 61.6 64.1
VGG13 61.1 64.0 64.0 50.1 12.2 49.7
VGG16 60.2 58.6 61.7 53.4 49.8 13.6
ADC
Clean 87.8 89.5 87.8 84.7 85.2 84.0
Res18 7.7 38.5 47.2 67.9 69.0 66.0
Res34 30.3 8.3 34.2 63.6 63.6 61.3
Res50 39.9 34.5 8.3 66.5 67.0 64.3
VGG11 72.1 74.2 75.3 9.8 63.3 65.8
VGG13 63.0 65.7 66.0 52.0 9.6 51.6
VGG16 61.3 60.8 63.3 55.2 51.6 12.0
Table 4: Evaluation results for model transferability.
Tab. 4 demonstrates the transferability of PQ-AG among
different CNN models. We conduct the experiments on
CIFAR-10 for ResNet and VGG models. As before, each
row header represents the model, form which the adversar-
ial queries are generated, while each column header repre-
sents the structure of the targeted model. For both SDC and
ADC product quantization retrieval systems, we divide the
table into four quarters. The diagonal quarters are designed
to evaluate the transferability of PQ-AG among the mod-
els from the same families (e.g. VGG11, VGG13, VGG16
are all from the VGG family), ensuring the models share
a certain amount of similarity. Therefore, we can see from
Tab. 4 that the mAP drops by a large margin of 68.5% and
51.6% respectively for ResNet and VGG models in this two
quarters on average. However, adversarial queries in other
two quarters are generated against one kind of models and
designed to fool models from completely different fami-
lies. Therefore, the task is obviously much more challeng-
ing. Even so, PQ-AG still manages to decrease the mAP by
24.9% on average in all these cases.
Conclusion
A novel PQ-AG algorithm is developed for generating ad-
versarial queries to fool the deep product quantization re-
treieval systems. With the estimation of the centroid distri-
bution, we propose a differentiable loss for back propagation
to generate adversarial queries. Extensive experiments are
conducted on two public datasets based on multiple network
structures, demonstrating that PQ-AG can effectively gen-
erate adversarial queries that induce the PQ based retrieval
models into retrieving semantically irrelevant results. In the
meantime, the transferability of the generated queries is also
evaluated under a variety of settings, revealing that PQ-AG
also works in black-box setting.
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